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Abstract 
 
A regulatory change in 2006, permitting equity compensations in China, 
offers a natural experiment to investigate drivers and outcomes of stock 
options. There are two unique features. First, adoption of stock options 
occurred rapidly com- pared to the US, where stock options have been 
around for more than 100 years with periods of high (1990s) and low 
(before 1950s) adoption. Second, stock options have been issued by state-
owned enterprises (SOEs), an unusual aspect. This study analyzes all listed 
companies in China from 2004 to 2014, testing two competing theories: 
optimal contracting and managerial power. If managers own more equity, if 
the CEO also serves as board chairman and if compensation committees 
exist, managers are more likely to receive stock options. Ownership type 
and firm characteristics are also essential factors in granting stock options. 
In non-SOEs, evidence suggests that controlling shareholders award stock 
op- tions less frequently but if they do they seem to induce managers to 
collude in tunneling. Applying a propensity score matching approach to 
account for an alleged self-selection bias, we do not observe any 
improvements in firm perfor- mance or shareholder value after stock 
options have been issued. Accordingly, managerial power seems to be the 
predominant driver for the introduction of stock options. Hence, 
managerial accountability and better disclosure are es- sential to ensure 
that stock options do contribute to value  creation. 
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1. Introduction 
 
On 31st of December 2005, the China Securities Regulatory 
Commission (CSRC) released the ‘Measures for the Administration of 
Stock Incentive Plans of Listed Companies’, permitting equity 
compensations. Hence, China offers a natural experiment where the 
adoption of stock options occurred in a 10-year narrow window as 
compared to the US, where stock options have been used for more than 
100 years with varying degrees of popularity. Given this unique setting, 
our study can explore early and late adopters of equity compensations 
from 2004 to 2014, revealing their motives and assessing whether stock 
options enhanced firm performance and shareholder value. 
Having been widely adopted and analyzed in developed countries, stock 
op- tions have long been regarded as an incentive mechanism to align 
CEOs’ and shareholders’ interests and to alleviate moral hazard problems 
(Yermack, 1995; Core and Guay, 1999). However, these mechanisms rely 
on a market-based governance system, where efficient stock markets reflect 
firm performance accu- rately. In spite of a long history of regulatory 
changes (Gao and Kling, 2006) and signs of improved efficiency (e.g. in the 
context of calendar anomalies, Kling and Gao (2005)), Chinese stock 
markets are not yet at par with their Western counterparts, and governance 
issues remain (Gao and Kling, 2008; Kling and Gao, 2008). Assessing 
why some firms adopted stock options, while others did not, and 
identifying who ultimately benefited is crucial in evaluating China’s recent  
compensation reform. 
Chinese stock options have been rarely studied with only a few 
excep- tions (Conyon and He, 2011; Fang et al., 2015), as it is a 
relatively new phe- nomenon. Thus, it has remained unclear what affects 
the decision to introduce stock options and whether desired outcomes can 
be realized. Despite ongoing market-oriented reforms, China still exhibits 
higher ownership   concentration, 
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less developed stock markets and weaker legal protections compared to 
Western economies. According to our data, over 62% of the listed firms 
have a con- trolling shareholder who owns over 30% of the firms’ 
outstanding shares, and the average ownership of controlling shareholders 
of all listed firms is 37%. By contrast, it is rare for investors to own more 
than 10% of the outstanding shares in Anglo-Saxon economies (Conyon 
and He, 2011). Furthermore, the state still plays a significant role in the 
economy through state-ownership, administrative governance and 
regulations (Gao and Kling, 2012). This unique institutional setting casts 
doubts on the real motivations and impacts of stock options. Why do 
state-controlled enterprises (SOEs) or companies dominated by a 
principal shareholder need stock options? And most importantly, is there 
any evidence on their value-enhancing capabilities. 
Empirical studies on equity compensation in developed countries yield 
con- flicting results. Yermack (1995) indicates that agency or financial 
contracting theories cannot explain the pattern of stock options awarded 
to CEOs in the US. He tests nine hypotheses based on agency theory, 
only finding support for two. More recently, based on an US sample from 
1982 to 2001, Kim and Ouimet (2014) documents that the number of 
employees and the size of options influ- ence the benefits of incentives 
schemes. They argue that stock options are most effective in firms with a 
small number of employees and where options account for a small fraction 
of firm value. In contrast, large equity compensation pack- ages are often 
implemented for non-incentive purposes and thus do not improve firm 
performance. 
Previous literature on Chinese executive compensation has mainly 
focused on cash payments (Firth et al., 2006; Chen et al., 2010, 2011), 
while equity compensation has been largely omitted due to data 
availability - except in the case of Hong Kong.  Yet, the institutional 
background of Hong Kong is   quite 
4 
 
This is the accepted version of an article published by Elsevier in Pacific-Basin Finance Journal Vol. 46 Part A., 124-
140. Published version available from: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pacfin.2017.09.007 
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/24654/ under CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 
International Licence 
  
 
 
 
 
 
different from mainland China.  Chen et al. (2013) analyze the stock  
options of red chip firms listed in Hong Kong and argue that stock options 
granted by state-controlled red chip firms are not effective. For mainland 
China, Chen et al. (2010) based on the managerial power perspective argue 
that CEO duality and CEO shareholding entrench managers to extract 
firms’ assets; however, they only analyze cash compensation. Conyon and 
He (2012) investigate the deter- minants of CEOs’ share-ownership and 
equity compensations based on agency theory.1 They argue that there is 
little evidence that governance variables in- fluence CEO pay. By contrast, 
a more recent study by Fang et al. (2015) yield conflicting results while 
investigating the employee stock options covering almost the same period. 
They find no relationship between executive stock ownership and options 
granted and report a negative correlation between board size and stock 
options. They also argue that employee stock options in China improved 
firm performance, and that better corporate governance enhanced this 
positive impact. Therefore, the understanding of equity compensations in 
China is far from clear, and it is essential to evaluate recent data. 
This paper attempts to fill this gap by addressing the following research 
ques- tions. First, why and under what circumstances did Chinese firms 
adopt stock options? Particularly, are stock options in Chinese firms an 
incentive device to solve agency problem or just a form of managerial 
discretion? Prior literature (Yermack, 1995; Conyon and He, 2012) is 
mainly based on the optimal con- tracting approach arguing that incentive 
compensation aligns shareholders’ and managers’ interests. By contrast, 
Bebchuk and Fried (2003) propose the man- agerial power approach 
arguing that compensation arrangements themselves could be part of an 
agency problem, because managers are able to exert  influ- 
 
 
1Conyon and He (2012) include stock options, restricted stock and share appreciation 
rights as equity compensation in their  study. 
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ence over the pay arrangements to extract private benefits. This paper 
tests both approaches. Second, do corporate governance and ownership 
structure af- fects stock options? As discussed earlier, the Chinese 
institutional background is quite different from other developed countries 
despite continuous reforms. Fi- nally, and most importantly, do stock 
options improved firm performance and shareholder value? Put 
differently, who benefits from stock options, managers or shareholders? 
To address these research questions, we analyze a comprehensive 
database of Chinese listed firms from 2004 to 2014, covering the complete 
and most recent period during which stock options have been adopted. 
There are analytical prob- lems related to an alleged self-section bias as 
well-performing firms enjoy better market valuation, increasing the 
propensity to grant stock options (Bergman and Jenter, 2007). These 
firms are more likely to present better post-event firm performance due to 
positive autocorrelation between past and present perfor- mance. To 
address this potential bias, we apply a propensity score matching method, 
comparing firms that adopted stock options to their matched control 
group and the unmatched sample. 
Our study yields the following insights. First, managerial power plays a 
sig- nificant role in stock options granted by Chinese firms. Our results 
indicate that managers are more likely to be awarded with stock options if 
they hold higher equity shareholdings in the firm, if the firm has a 
compensation committee and if the CEO is also the chairman of the board 
of directors. Second, ownership type matters. In line with previous 
literature (Conyon and He, 2011; Chen et al., 2010), we find that state 
controlled firms are less likely to adopt stock options. However, we do not 
observe a significant impact of ownership concentration, which is in line 
with Fang et al. (2015) but contradicts Conyon and He (2012). Third, 
firms with younger executives are more likely to award their  managers 
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with stock options. Fourth, firm characteristics are also essential in the 
decision to issue stock options. We show that financial leverage, firm size 
and growth opportunities are important factors in shaping executive pay 
packages. Prior firm performance also influences stock options positively. 
In addition, high tech- nology firms are more likely to grant options. 
Finally, controlling shareholders play a role in non-state controlled firms. 
Non-SOEs controlled by a shareholder tend to issue stock options less 
frequently as incentives should matter less given the direct control. Yet, if 
controlled firms issue stock options, tunneling seems to increase, 
suggesting that stock options are awarded to managers to induce them to 
collude with the principal shareholder. 
Our propensity score matching shows that stock options do not improve 
firm performance or stock returns, violating the argument of the optimal 
contracting approach that equity compensation helps to resolve agency 
problems. Hence, it seems likely that powerful managers influence pay 
arrangements, making execu- tive compensations ineffective. Stock 
options are, to some extent, rather a form of managerial rent exaction than 
an incentive to maximize shareholder value. 
Our study makes several contributions. First, we present the most 
recent evidence on Chinese stock options since their introduction in 2006. 
Second, this study is the first attempt to analyze Chinese stock options 
based on both approaches, optimal contracting and managerial power, 
which provides a dif- ferent perspective on executive pay dominated by 
agency theory. Third, our study controls for an alleged self-section bias 
using a propensity score matching, which provides unbiased estimates of 
post-event firm performance. Finally, the Chinese context allows us to 
study the early adoption of incentive plans, which is not possible to 
observe in developed markets. 
Our results provide several policy implications. With reform 
deepening, managers have received substantial power over business 
operations.  However, 
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there are no adequate monitoring mechanisms in position to avoid 
managerial self-dealing activities.  Therefore, increasing financial 
transparency and informa- tion disclosure, especially more detailed 
disclosure on executive compensation, are called for to improve managers’ 
accountability.  Furthermore, Chinese mar- kets also require more legal 
protection towards shareholders, especially minority shareholders, to 
prevent them from being harmed by self-dealing managers. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes 
the institutional background. Section 3 discusses the underlying theories.  
Section 4 describes data collection and methodology. Results are discussed 
in Section 5 followed by a discussion and  conclusion. 
 
2. Institutional background 
 
Compared to Anglo-Saxon economies, relatively little is known about 
ex- ecutive compensation and CEO equity incentives in China (Firth et al., 
2006; Conyon and He, 2011). This section briefly describes the 
institutional back- ground in China and how it influences our theoretical 
and empirical analysis. 
China has been reforming its economy since 1978, and the market-
oriented reform has largely influenced the evolution of Chinese executive 
compensation (Chen et al., 2011). Prior to these reforms, the Chinese 
economy was controlled centrally, and all enterprises were state owned. 
The main objective of these state-owned enterprises (SOEs) was to fulfill 
political targets such as providing employment to maintain social stability. 
All profits were repatriated to the state. There were neither incentive 
schemes nor profit sharing schemes for managers. Reforms in the 1980s 
featured basic profit retention and profit sharing schemes to incentivize 
managers (Sun and Tong, 2003). At this stage, a preliminary managerial 
resource allocation system has been brought forward, and managers began 
to take some responsibilities for decision making, which allowed them to 
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control a more substantial amount of economic resources (Groves et al., 
1994). With the reopening of the two stock exchanges in Shanghai and 
Shenzhen in the 1990s, the corporatization of SOEs dominated the 
following years. Through public listing in stock exchanges, SOEs were 
expected to transfer from sole state proprietorships to public shareholding 
companies, which is the main form of modern firms in developed 
countries with diversified ownership and inde- pendent decision making. 
The main targets of the corporatization were (1) to change state 
ownership to publicly traded ownership; (2) to separate the state from 
business operations so that enterprises can achieve full autonomy over 
business decisions; (3) to improve managerial incentives by linking 
executive compensation to firm performance (Chen et al., 2011). In 2005, 
the Chinese government brought forward the non-tradable shares reform 
to partially pri- vatize SOEs with the aim to deepen the reform and to 
effectively incentivize managers. Although the state has still retained 
sufficient shares to maintain voting control (Firth et al., 2006; Chen et al., 
2011), managers have acquired new powers and autonomy within firms 
than ever before. Finally, on December 31th, 2005, the China Securities 
Regulatory Commission (CSRC) released the ‘Measures for the 
Administration of Stock Incentive Plans of Listed Companies’ encouraging 
the adoption of equity incentive schemes with the aim to better 
incentivize managers. 
However, there are no appropriate mechanisms currently in position to 
pre- vent managers from abusing their new powers (Chen et al., 2011). 
According to He (1998), many mangers in Chinese listed firms have 
extracted private benefits through their newly gained independence. In 
contrast to developed economies with dispersed ownership, Chinese listed 
firms are characterized by high own- ership concentration, dominant 
shareholders and insider rent extraction (Chen, 2005; Firth et al., 2006; 
Gao and Kling, 2008). Furthermore, current corporate 
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governance mechanisms, such as adequate financial transparency, 
information disclosure and protection towards minority shareholders, are 
not in place (Chen, 2005; Liu, 2006; Gao and Kling, 2012). These 
systematic weaknesses enable mangers to reap private benefits at the 
expense of shareholders. 
Although many policies and regulations2 have been brought forward to 
re- form the corporate governance system, the underdeveloped external 
monitoring mechanisms and stock markets cast doubt on the real effects of 
the reforms. 
 
3. Underlying Theories 
 
There are two main theoretical views regarding executive 
compensation, the optimal contracting approach based on agency theory, 
and the managerial power perspective. Given the peculiarities of the 
Chinese governance system and a large number of reforms, it seems to be 
likely that both approaches might play a role in explaining the adoption 
of stock options. Agency theory has been the dominant view from a 
policy perspective as most reforms have been aimed at reducing agency 
costs. However, the question as to whether managers have become too 
powerful points to the alternative approach. Hence, we test both 
theoretical perspectives. The following section briefly outlines the basic 
agency problem and explains theoretical predictions. We identify variables 
for each theoretical approach that could affect the adoption of stock options. 
Empirically, it is challenging to discriminate between the two theoretical 
approaches as some variables could be regarded as proxies for both 
theories.  Hence, it is crucial 
 
 
2e.g., the CSRC revised the ‘Format and Content of Information Disclosure’, 
requiring companies to disclose the total compensation of each individual director, 
supervisor and senior manager.  In 2013, the CSRC again revised the ‘Content and 
Format of the Annual  Report of GEM (Growth Enterprise Market)’ listed companies 
and the GEM companies are now required to disclose their decision-making process 
and the determinants of compensation for directors, supervisors and senior managers, in 
addition to the actual payments made to each of them. In 2009, the Ministry of Human 
Resources and Social Security (MHRSS) issued the ‘Further Guidance to Standardize 
Executives Compensation Contracts in Central-government- controlled Companies (The 
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in our empirical strategy to identify whether firm performance and 
shareholder value actually improved after the introduction of stock options. 
An improvement would signal that agency conflicts were resolved through 
the incentive scheme. In contrast, if firms did not perform better, it 
would suggest that managers would be the only beneficiaries. 
 
3.1. The optimal contracting approach 
The agency problem is at the heart of modern firms (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976) and its essence is the separation of ownership and control 
(Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). In general terms, investors and managers sign 
a contract specify- ing what managers do in terms of investment and how 
profits are to be allocated. However, many unforeseen circumstances make 
a complete contract infeasible. Furthermore, due to investors’ lack of 
professional qualifications and access to information, managers maintain 
substantial residual control rights over how to allocate investors’ funds. 
Managers therefore have both the ability and incentive to take discretionary 
activities3 to pursue private benefits of control (Grossman and Hart, 1988). 
Executive compensation, among various corporate governance 
mechanisms, has been designed to address this misalignment of interests. 
Incentive compensation4  has been deemed to incentivize managers to 
select and implement actions to increase shareholder value (Jensen and 
Murphy, 1990). This view has been labeled ‘optimal contracting approach’ 
which sees compen- sation arrangements as ‘an arm’s length contract’ to align 
managers’ interests with those of shareholders.  Under this approach,  stock 
options,  an important form  of  incentive  compensation,  has  become  
increasingly  popular.   According 
 
 
3Managerial expropriation can take various forms. For example, managers can 
directly abscond with money in a pyramid structure. It can also take more elaborate 
forms such as transfer pricing on firms’ output or even assets and unreasonable high 
executive compensation. Other manifestations include expanding firms beyond 
rational, pursuing pet projects and resisting being replaced for poor management. 
4Incentive contracts can take various forms such as share ownership, stock options 
and a threat of dismissal in case of poor performance (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997) 
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to a survey by Core et al. (2003), over 70% of CEOs have received new 
option grants, and options have become a major component of CEOs’ 
compensation in the US by 1994. A number of previous studies in 
developed markets that ana- lyze the adoption of stock options are largely 
based on the optimal contracting approach (Core et al., 2003; Jensen and 
Murphy,  1990; Yermack,    1995). 
 
3.2. The managerial power approach 
 
As opposed to the optimal contracting approach, Bebchuk and Fried 
(2003) propose that the design of compensation arrangement is part of 
the agency problem rather than a solution to it. They argue that executives 
have substantial influence over their own pay. One of the most direct 
ways to extract rents is to set themselves favorable pay arrangement. This 
approach in the context of executive compensation has been labeled 
managerial power approach. 
Stock options have long been argued to provide incentive to managers 
since they link managers’ wealth directly to stock performance, but options 
fail to fil- ter out stock price increases unrelated to mangers’ own 
performance and efforts. This is particularly the case when the whole 
industry or the market experiences an economic boom or a phase of 
overvaluation. In this case, even managers that perform poorly can get a 
large amount of pay-back through stock options. Hence, the ‘windfall’ 
feature of stock options makes them more favorable to managers  than  
shareholders. 
In spite of these shortcomings, stock options that favor managers are 
still common in many countries. Bebchuk and Fried (2003) explain this 
phenomenon as designing compensation schemes that benefit executives 
without being per- ceived as clearly unreasonable or flawed. There are ways 
to replace stock options with ‘reduced-windfalls’ options. For instance, index 
options, which link the ex- ercise price to a market-wide or a sector-specific 
index, can differentiate between firm performance and wider changes in 
markets or industries.  Moreover, cer- 
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tain vesting conditions can limit the ‘windfall-effect’. They have, however, 
been largely ignored. In China, some stock options have vesting 
conditions such as meeting predetermined performance criteria (usually 
based on return on eq- uity). Yet, at-the-money options are still the 
predominant form, and vesting conditions can be somewhat ambiguous 
and flexible. 
In summary, the managerial power approach contends that powerful 
man- agers are more likely to be awarded with favorable pay 
arrangement such as stock options due to their influence over the 
compensation setting process. 
 
3.3. Discriminating between the two theories 
 
To test the two theories, our empirical strategy needs to identify 
discriminat- ing variables, which is challenging as some variables are 
related to both theories. In line with our research questions, we focus on a 
pre-event analysis, which de- termines factors that explain the adoption 
of stock options, and a post-event analysis, which evaluates the impact 
of stock options on firm performance. 
 
3.3.1. Pre-event analysis: Determinants of stock options 
The optimal contracting approach suggests that managerial direct stock own- 
ership constitutes a substitute to stock options, as it provides the most 
direct link between shareholders’ and CEOs’ wealth (Murphy, 1999; Berle and 
Means, 1991; Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Therefore, in line with agency 
theory, stock options are more likely to be adopted if managers hold smaller 
portion of stocks. Consequently, if the optimal contracting approach applies 
to the Chinese case, we would observe a negative impact of managerial 
shareholding on stock op- tions granted. Interestingly, the role of 
managerial stock ownership can also be viewed from the managerial power 
approach, yielding a different prediction. Be- cause stock ownership endows 
managers with direct voting rights, managers have more power over firms’ 
decisions.  Given the Chinese institutional  background, 
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the ongoing reform has substantially reduced government intervention in 
firms’ operations, increasing managers’ power in allocating resources. 
Although ex- ecutives’ stock ownership is designed to align the interests of 
shareholders and managers (alignment effect), the entrenchment effect 
dominates when mangers’ equity stake rises (Fama and Jensen, 1983). 
Consequently, under the manage- rial power approach, we predict that 
managerial stock ownership has a positive impact on the adoption of stock    
options. 
Controlling shareholders are also important actors in the principal-agent 
problem. Shleifer and Vishny (1997, p.754) contend that ”large shareholders 
address agency problems in that they have both a general interest in profit 
maximization, and enough control over the assets of the firm to have their 
in- terest respected”. Therefore, agency theory predicts a lower propensity to 
issue stock options with the presence of a controlling shareholder. 
However, large shareholders do not always bring benefits in the sense of 
enhancing shareholder value. According to Claessens et al. (2002), firm 
values fall and entrenchment ef- fects dominate when control rights of the 
largest shareholder exceed its cash-flow rights. Hence, the controlling 
shareholder has an incentive to purse private ben- efits at the expense of 
minority shareholders through various forms of tunneling (Johnson et al., 
2000). This is especially the case in China where legal systems and 
corporate governance are not yet effective in protecting minority sharehold- 
ers’ interests. Furthermore, the controlling shareholder is also the manager 
in many instances in Chinese firms, and tunneling is usually achieved 
through col- lusion between controlling shareholders and executives (Wang 
and Xiao, 2011). Given the aforementioned shortcomings of stock options, 
it is likely that they are awarded to induce managers to collude with 
controlling shareholders. Thus, the Type II agency problem, i.e. the 
conflict between controlling shareholder and minority shareholder, implies 
a positive association between the presence 
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of a controlling shareholder and the adoption of stock options. 
Similarly, ownership concentration also matters. Since dispersed 
ownership is common in most developed countries, minority shareholders 
usually lack the ability and incentive to monitor managers’ actions. 
Therefore, monitoring by investors is easier if control is concentrated in 
the hands of a small number of investors. Since shareholders’ monitoring 
and incentive contracts are substitutes in solving agency problems, it is 
predicted that stock options are less likely to be adopted by firms with 
higher ownership concentration. The managerial power approach results 
in the same prediction as managers in firms with high ownership 
concentration exercise less influence. 
State control is a special type of ownership structure, where the state 
ex- ercises control over firms. In China, bureaucrats possess control rights, 
but no corresponding cash flow rights because cash flow rights of SOEs 
are related to government budgets. Moreover, SOEs also pursue political 
objectives rather than shareholder value maximization, such as offering 
job opportunities to en- hance social stability. Therefore, bureaucrats are 
less concerned about opti- mizing firm performance. SOEs thus lack the 
incentive to adopt stock options. Additionally, most managers in SOEs 
are appointed by the government and are rewarded with political 
promotions by fulfilling political targets (Conyon and He, 2011). Hence, 
managers are less sensitive to incentive compensation schemes than their 
counterparts in private firms. In summary, both, the princi- pal (the state) 
and the agent (managers) in SOEs are less concerned with profits than 
those in private entities. SOEs, therefore, are predicted to be less likely 
than private firms to grant stock options. Arguably, managers in SOEs are 
less powerful due to direct state control and monitoring, e.g. the State-
owned As- sets Supervision and Administration Commission of the State 
Council (SASAC) exercises control over the largest SOEs (Gao and Kling, 
2012). Hence, the man- 
16 
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agerial power approach suggests a similar negative impact of state 
ownership on the propensity to issue stock options. 
Setting up compensation committees is originally a mechanism to enhance 
corporate governance under the optimal contracting approach. These 
commit- tee employ compensation professionals to provide advice on pay 
and the design of effective executive compensation packages. Better internal 
governance mech- anisms should act as a substitute to stock options. 
Based on the managerial power approach, however, compensation 
committees use their discretion to ben- efit CEOs, since CEOs can 
influence the appointment of members of the com- mittee. Furthermore, 
setting a compensation arrangement that harms CEO’s interests could also 
affect committee members by decreasing the probability to be hired again. 
This is especially the case in China where guanxi. i.e. social capital and 
networks, is an important principle in business relations. Previous literature 
(Gillan, 2001) also argues that compensation consultants tend to fa- vor 
CEOs by justifying high level of executive pay through providing favorable 
compensation data. Murphy (1999) states that executive pay increases 
due to a combination of helpful compensation consultants and sympathetic 
boards. 
An effective board structure is expected to reduce agency problems 
through appropriate monitoring of management under the optimal 
contracting approach. The managerial power approach predicts that 
compensation will be more favor- able to managers when the board is 
relatively weak and inefficient. The board is regarded as weak when it is too 
large because a free-rider problem emerges ham- pering the monitoring role 
of board members (Yermack, 1996). So large boards based on both 
theories should increase the propensity to issue stock options. When the 
CEO or general manager also serves as board chairman, the board is also 
assumed to be less efficient. This is because combining the two posts will 
potentially increase CEOs’ power and thus reduce boards’   independence 
17 
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(Conyon and He, 2012). We therefore conjecture that if the managerial 
power approach applies to China, we would observe a positive 
correlation between board size, duality and stock option granted 
respectively. 
Executive’s age has also been regarded as an important factor. 
Different from conventional cash compensation, stock options benefit 
receivers over a relatively long period of time. In the US, stock options are 
usually vested over a 10-year period. In China, the average vesting period 
is 4 to 5 years as discussed in the empirical analysis. Older executives, 
especially close to retirement, would prefer cash compensation to stock 
options. By contrast, stock options would provide more incentive to 
younger executives because they have enough time in post to enjoy 
benefits. We therefore predict that executive’s age is negatively related to 
the adoption of stock options, which is mainly based on the optimal 
contracting approach. The link between managerial power and age seems 
to suggest an opposite effect as older executives might be more powerful. 
Yet, this effect is mitigated by the argument that older CEOs still prefer 
cash to equity compensations. 
There are also firm level factors that affect the adoption of stock 
options. Capital structure, measured by financial leverage, affects stock 
options as debt holders monitor managers’ decision making, e.g. contractual 
obligations linked to performance measures (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).  
A higher   proportion of debt, therefore, enables creditors to have more 
power to monitor managers to prevent them from pursuing over-risky 
projects that could potentially hurt creditors’ interests. An easy way to 
reduce managers’ incentive to take on these risky projects is to lessen 
the pay-performance sensitivity of executive compensation. We predict a 
negative impact of financial leverage level on stock options. 
Large firms  are deemed to face more difficulties and problems in    
manage- 
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ment (e.g. complexity), their managers thus need more incentives. As for 
the firms that are in a growing stage, managers usually have more 
information than shareholder on firms’ growth opportunities. In order to 
reduce the agency prob- lem caused by information asymmetry, managers 
in high-growth firms are more likely to be awarded with stock options. 
Theoretically, the managerial power ap- proach would suggest similar 
predictions in the context of firm size and growth opportunities. 
Previous firm performance also affects stock option granted. Here, the 
two theories suggest opposing partial impacts, enabling us to discriminate 
between them. Agency theory implies that under-performing firms are 
more likely to adopt stock options to incentivize managers, leading to a 
negative partial impact of previous firm performance. In contrast, under 
the managerial power theory, firms with better prior firm performance are 
more likely to grant options because managers have a higher probability to 
benefit from the increase in market value driven by good performance. 
Finally, high-technology firms are predicted to be more likely to grant op- 
tions. Previous work (Core et al., 2003) shows that the use of stock 
options varies across industries. High-technology firms rely more on human 
resources, especially technicians with key skills. Providing higher incentives 
to attract and retain professionals is essential. For instance, as the leading 
high-technology firm in China, Alibaba offered over 490 million dollars to 
its employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs). The two theories do not lead 
to different predictions in the context of industry-specific  effects. 
 
3.3.2. Post-event analysis: Outcome of stock options 
Distinguishing between the two theoretical perspectives is challenging 
in the pre-event analysis because many explanatory variables are predicted 
to exhibit similar partial impacts on the adoption of stock options.  Yet, 
three    variables 
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stand out. First, managerial stock ownership is a substitute for stock 
options under the optimal contracting approach - but suggests more 
managerial power. So optimal contracting suggests a negative impact, 
while managerial power pre- dicts a positive impact. Second, 
compensation committees are supposed to improve internal governance 
making stock options less likely based on the op- timal contracting 
approach, whereas they might increase equity compensations in line with 
managerial power. Third, poor past performance increases the like- lihood 
of stock options under agency theory - contrary to the managerial power 
argument. 
The post-event analysis offers an easier theoretical approach to 
distinguish between the two theories. If the optimal contracting approach 
is valid, one should expect that stock options mitigate agency conflicts, 
resulting in better firm and stock market performance after the issue. If 
the managerial power approach is true, one should not expect any 
performance improvements after issues. In spite of its theoretical clarity, 
empirically establishing the post-event outcome of stock options is 
difficult due to the self-section effect, requiring a propensity score 
matching (or similar) approach. 
 
4. Data and methodology 
 
4.1. Data collection 
 
Our sample is an unbalanced panel dataset comprising all firms listed on 
the Main Board (both Shanghai and Shenzhen), the Small and Medium-
sized En- terprises (SME) Board and the Growth Enterprises Market 
(GEM) Board from 2004 to 2014. We collect our data from the China Stock 
Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database, which provides 
financial and stock market data. Additional data such as details of each 
stock option plan is hand collected from the official websites of the 
Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges that are 
20 
 
This is the accepted version of an article published by Elsevier in Pacific-Basin Finance Journal Vol. 46 Part A., 124-
140. Published version available from: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pacfin.2017.09.007 
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/24654/ under CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 
International Licence 
  
 
 
 
 
 
authorized by the CSRC for public information disclosure. 
Our sample selection process is as follows. Among the 21,349 firm-
year observations, 482 adopted stock option plans. Since we require non 
missing data for the propensity score matching, it reduces our sample 
size of the so- called treatment group, i.e. firms with stock options, to 396 
observations. 
Our sample is unique in the following aspects. First, it includes 
equity compensation that has been largely ignored due to data 
availability by prior executive compensation research in China (Conyon 
and He, 2011; Cao et al., 2011). Second, our data covers a more complete 
and recent sample period from 2004 to 2014 while prior research on China 
only uses data before 2011 (Conyon and He, 2011; Fang et al., 2015). 
Finally, compared with studies in the US and UK, our sample is unique 
because we look at early adoption of incentive plans, which is not 
possible to observe in developed markets as most firms use incentives 
since the 1950s. 
 
4.2. Logistic regressions for the pre-event analysis 
 
In line with prior research (Conyon and He, 2011; Chen et al., 2013) and 
our theoretical considerations, logistic models explain the binary variable 
ISSUE, 
i.e.  whether  a  firm  introduces  stock  options  or  not  as  shown  in  equation  
(1), where  i  =  1, 2, ..., N  refers  to  firms  and  t  =  1, 2, ..., T   indicates  years.   
The error  term  Eit  has  the  usual  properties,  i.e.   i.i.d.   distributed  with  
mean  zero and constant variance.  However, our empirical models also 
considers random- effects, i.e.  including a firm-specific error term into (1) 
and fixed-effects models, 
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including industry and year-specific  effects. 
 
 
ISSUEit = α + β1HITECHit + β2LEVit + β3SIZEit 
+ β4GROWTHit + β5ROEit + β6RETURNit + β7COMCit 
+ β8DUALITYit + β9BOARDit + β10AGEit 
+ β11MANSHAREit + β12STATEit 
+ β13HERF INDAHLit + β14Qit + Eit (1) 
 
 
Studies on stock options in developed markets tend to use the 
calculated value of options based on the Black-Scholes formula as 
dependent variable (Yer- mack, 1995; Chen et al., 2013). Theoretically, 
our focus is on whether firms adopt stock options after the policy change 
in 2006; therefore, an indicator vari- able, ISSUE, is an appropriate 
dependent variable in our study. In line with our theoretical discussion, we 
use several explanatory variables shown in equa- tion (1) to discriminate 
between optimal contracting and managerial power. We measure state 
control with a dummy variable, STATE, which equals  one if the firm is 
state controlled and zero otherwise. Ownership concentration is measured 
with the HERFINDAHL index based on the shareholding of the five largest 
shareholders. MANSHARE represents the percentage of shares owned by 
executives. AGE is the average age of all executives of each firm in each 
year. DUALITY is a dummy variable, which takes the value of one if the 
board chairman also takes the position of CEO or general manager and zero 
otherwise. BOARD is the number of board members indicating board size. 
COMC is a dummy variable, which takes the value of one if the firm has 
a compensation committee and zero otherwise. 
LEV measures financial leverage calculated as the ratio of total debt to 
total assets. We use two performance measurements, the accounting-based 
return on 
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equity (ROE ) and the market-based annual stock return (RETURN ). We 
also include the growth rate of total assets (GROWTH ). SIZE refers to the 
natural logarithm of firms’ total assets. Chen et al. (2010) and Conyon and 
He (2011) measure growth opportunity  with  the  market-to-book  ratio  of  
equity.  Instead, we use Tobin’s Q (Q ), which is a better measure when 
comparing firms with different levels of debt. As outlined in the following 
section, Tobin’s Q combines growth opportunities but also overvaluation, 
warranting a more comprehensive analysis. 
We also control  for  industry  effects.  The  industry  classification  is 
based on the ‘Guidelines for the Industry Classification of Listed 
Companies (2012 Revision)’ proposed by the CSRC, which has been used by 
the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. The scientific research 
industry, the health industry and the IT industry are the top three industries 
with respect to the adoption rate of stock options, with a proportion of 
11.84%, 10.53%, and 6.13% respectively. To focus on these high-technology 
industries, we use the dummy HITECH. According to the ‘National Hi-Tech 
Enterprises Management Approach’,5 the high-technology sector refers to 
information technology, biomedicine and new technologies (health), 
aerospace, new materials, hi-tech services, new energy and energy-saving 
technology, resource and environmental technology and tra- ditional 
industries transformed by high technology. In robustness checks, we also 
incorporate the original 19 industry dummies in line with prior research. 
Alternately, we also specify random effects models. Table 1 presents the 
defini- tions of variables. 
 
 
5Released by the Ministry of Science and Technology in 2008 
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4.3. Non-SOE subgroup analysis 
 
Since incentives for non-SOEs to adopt stock options could depend on 
the absence or presence of a controlling shareholder, we split non-SOEs 
into sub- groups. The Chinese Security Law and Company Law defines 
an investor as having control over a listed company based on the 
following criteria: (1) the investor holds more than 50% of the shares in 
the listed company; (2) the in- vestor controls over 30% of the share voting 
rights of the firm; (3) the investor controls the appointment of more than 
half of the members of the board of di- rectors through actual control of 
share voting rights; (4) the investor, by virtue of share voting rights held 
directly, exercises major influence over the resolutions of shareholders’ 
general meetings of the company; or (5) other circumstances recognized by 
the CSRC. We therefore use two thresholds, 30% and 50%, to define the 
presence of a principal shareholder. The dummies CONTROL 30 and 
CONTROL 50 are equal to one if the controlling shareholding exceeds the 
respective threshold, and zero   otherwise. 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
 
4.4. Decomposing valuation levels 
 
Valuation levels such as market-to-book ratios or Tobin’s Q capture a firm’s 
overvaluation but also growth  expectations.  Therefore,  it  is  difficult  to  
estab- lish whether a firm is actually overvalued  or  whether  high  valuation  
levels  re- flect justifiable expectations about future growth. To determine  firm  
(FIRM ), sector (SECTOR) and long-run overvaluation (LONGRUN ), we 
modify the de- composition proposed by Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005), which 
originally refers to decomposing market-to-book ratios. Following the same 
logic, we apply the decomposition to Tobin’s Q, i.e. our approach focuses on 
the entity level (e.g. total assets and market value of debt and equity) not the 
equity level (e.g.  total 
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equity and market value of equity). The first model (MODEL I) regresses 
the value of equity and debt (numerator of Tobin’s Q), mit, of firm i in year 
t on the book value of total assets, bit (denominator of Tobin’s Q). The 
coefficients, α0jt and α1jt, vary over time and industry j based on a 
classification with 19 industries. 
 
mit = α0jt + α1jtbit + Eit (2) 
 
 
Firm-specific overvaluation is equal to the observed market value of debt 
and equity minus the predicted value given a firm’s fundamentals, where 
coefficients vary over time and across industries. Industry  or  sector  related  
overvaluation refers to the difference in predicted valuations with varying time-
industry co- efficients  and  predictions  based  on  time  averages.   Coefficients  
in  (2)  are aver- 
aged over time so that α¯ 1j  =  1 ),T
 
α1jt.  The difference between predicted 
T t=1 
valuation based on time averages  and  actual  fundamentals  determines  the  
long- run component, which reflects a firm’s long-run growth potential. In 
line with Rhodes-Kropf et al. (2005), MODEL II extends (2) by including the 
natural logarithm of the  absolute  value  of  earnings  before  interest  and  taxes,  
eit,  and an interaction term between eit and the indicator  variable  Iit,  which  
takes  the value one if the firm makes losses and zero otherwise. 
 
mit = α0jt + α1jtbit + β0jteit + β1jtIiteit + Eit (3) 
 
 
The decomposition mechanism is the same as in MODEL I, the 
difference is that (3) allows for additional fundamental variables. Finally, 
MODEL III incorporates financial leverage (LEV ) as shown in   (4). 
 
mit = α0jt + α1jtbit + β0jteit + β1jtIiteit + γjtLEVit + Eit (4) 
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4.5. Propensity score matching for the post-event analysis 
 
Estimating the impact of stock options on various measures of firm 
per- formance such as profitability (ROE ), growth (GROWTH ) and stock 
returns (RETURN ) could be problematic due to an alleged self-selection 
bias. Because well-performing firms enjoy better market valuations, they 
are more likely to grant stock options. These firms are therefore more 
likely to present better post-event firm performance due to employee 
optimism (Bergman and Jenter, 2007). Consequently, an observed better 
performance in the post-event period may be just a continuation of 
superior past performance, i.e. positive autocor- relation, rather than a real 
improvement due to the issue of stock  options. 
Accordingly, we  use propensity  score matching to form a treatment  
group and a control group. In order to find the most appropriate 
matching obser- vations for the treatment group, we first specify a logistic 
regression model to identify factors that predict a firm’s decision to award 
stock options. Hence, we first ask the question: why do companies issue 
stock options? In line with our theoretical framework, this decision is likely 
to be influenced by firm-specific fac- tors, market factors, overvaluation, 
industry factors, and corporate governance mechanisms including CEOs’ 
power. Second, we determine propensity scores based on an optimal 
selection model in terms of information criteria following a general-to-
specific approach. Based on the nearest neighborhood matching method, 
we form a matched control group. Companies in the control group had 
the highest probability of adopting options, i.e. they are a close match to 
the treatment group in terms of underlying factors - but they did not issue 
op- tions. The treatment group refers to companies that adopted stock 
options. By comparing the treatment group, the matched and unmatched 
control group we can establish whether stock options actually enhanced 
value drivers (GROWTH, ROE ) and led to higher shareholder value 
(RETURN ). This post-event analysis 
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offers an opportunity to assess whether stock options work as promised by 
the optimal contracting approach, or only work in favor of managers in 
line with the managerial power approach. 
 
5. Empirical analysis 
 
5.1. Descriptive statistics 
 
Table 2 presents annual figures including the number of new stock 
option plans issued (ISSUE ), the number of existing plans (OPTION ) and the 
number of established stock option plans in SOEs and high-tech companies. 
Since their first adoption in 2006, between 0.8% and 3.6% of all companies 
in the sample have issued new stock options in a respective year. In 2007,  
only  13  options were granted, which can be explained by the onset of the 
Global Financial Cri- sis that affected financial markets severely. At a first 
glance, Table 2 seems to indicate that 10 years since China first 
introduced equity compensation in 2006, only a few firms have adopted 
stock options as part of their executive pay packages. However, considering 
the number of firms with outstanding stock op- tions, it becomes apparent 
that 15.5% of companies use equity compensations in 2014. Moreover, there 
is a profound difference between state-owned enterprises (SOEs), where 
equity compensation is rare with only 7.9% of SOEs awarding stock 
options, and companies in the high-technology sector, where 30.5% rely on 
stock options. These descriptive patterns suggest that state ownership 
(STATE ) and operating in the high-technology sector (HITECH ) are likely 
contenders to explain the adoption of equity    compensation. 
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
To capture the alleged impact of controlling shareholders, Table 3 
displays the proportion of stock options in subgroups of non-SOEs 
applying the two 
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thresholds 30% and 50%, respectively. Interestingly, the prevalence of 
stock options between firms with and without controlling shareholder is 
quite close based on the 30% threshold. However, considering the 50% 
threshold controlled firms exhibit markedly lower adoption rates. 
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
To reveal the underlying motive for adopting stock options  in controlled 
firms, we investigate the level of tunneling of non-SOE subgroups 
around is- sues. Since inter-corporate loans tend to be the main channel 
through which controlling shareholders expropriate assets (Jiang et al., 
2010), we use other re- ceivables to total assets (ORECTA) to proxy 
tunneling in line with prior studies (Liu and Tian, 2012; Wang and Xiao, 
2011). Table 4 displays the level of inter- corporate loans (ORECTA) for 
subgroups one year before [t-1], one year after [t+1] and two years after 
[t+2] firms issued stock options. As tunneling also depends on other firm 
and industry-specific factors, we fit a panel OLS model controlling for 
firm size, leverage, growth, profitability and industry. Table 4 reports 
differences in tunneling accounting for these firm and industry-specific 
effects. Tunneling has increased only in the case of controlled firms based 
on the 50% threshold after the introduction of stock options. Therefore, the 
increase in inter-corporate loans in the post-option period compared to the 
pre-option pe- riod demonstrates that stock options could be another tool 
used by controlling shareholders  to  increase tunneling. 
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
Table 5 summarizes descriptive statistics of all firm-level variables used 
in our empirical analysis. All variables have been winsorized at the 5 and 
95-percentile to mitigate the impact of outliers. In line with our theoretical 
considerations, we use a set of firm controls including firm size (SIZE ), 
financial leverage (LEV ), 
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annual growth rates in total assets (GROWTH ) and return on equity (ROE 
). The latter two variables are also outcome variables in our assessment of 
the im- pact of stock options on firms’ value drivers. Due to using the natural 
logarithm of total assets as a measure of firm size, the resulting 
distribution is symmet- ric. On average, companies have grown by 15% a 
year, and return on equity has been 7%, underlining high growth but only 
modest levels of profitability. All firm controls exhibit a considerable 
range, highlighting heterogeneity in the sample. Stock returns (RETURN ) 
have varied widely in the sample. Market valuation measured by Tobin’s Q 
(Q ) might explain the timing of awarding stock options. To identify firm 
(FIRM ), industry (SECTOR) and long-term (LON- GRUN ) overvaluation, 
we conducted a decomposition as discussed in Section 
4.4. As shown in Table 2 state-ownership (STATE ) and operating in the 
high- technology sector matter (HITECH ). On average, only 7% of 
companies are in the high-technology sector, whereas 31% are controlled 
by the state. Finally, Table 5 includes proxies of corporate governance. On 
average 20% of companies exhibit DUALITY as CEOs also serve as 
chairmen of the board of directors. On average 32% of companies have 
committees to assess executives’ compen- sations COMC. The size of the 
board of directors varies considerable with a maximum number of 22 
members. The age of executives (AGE ) is rather con- centrated around 48 
years, which is young compared to more developed markets. Shareholding of 
executives is on average 7% (MANSHARE ). 
Ownership concentration measured by the HERFINDAHL index is 
relatively high in China. Furthermore, the presence of controlling 
shareholder is still common. On average 25% of listed firms are 
controlled by a shareholder who owns over half of the outstanding shares 
(CONTROL50 ). When we define a controlling shareholder as holding over 
30% of shares, the percent of firms with a controlling shareholder increases 
to 62% (CONTROL30 ). The average extent of 
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tunneling measured by inter-corporate loans (ORECTA) in our sample 
reaches 3%. It is remarkably lower than the average of 8.1% for the period 
from 1996 to 2004 reported by Jiang et al. (2010) and slightly lower than 
the average of 3.5% reported by Liu and Tian (2012) for the period from 
2004 to 2010. These discrepancies reflect differences in sampling and 
most importantly a reduction of the measure over time. 
 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
Table 6 shows the contractual features of newly issued stock options.  
Panel A focuses on all newly issued stock option plans.  Panel B reports 
the charac- teristics of stock options in the case of state-owned 
enterprises, whereas Panel C  refers  to  companies  operating  in  the  high-
technology  sector.  The  stock  op- tion  plans  in  China  only  cover  an  
average  of  3.31%  of  the  outstanding  shares (SHARE ),  which  is  relatively  
low  compared  to  US  firms.6     Accordingly,  dis- tinguishing between small 
and large awards defined as options covering less or more than 5 % of the 
firm’s total outstanding shares as suggested by Kim and Ouimet (2014),  is 
less meaningful  in  the Chinese  context.  Additionally,  stock options only 
cover an average of 0.09% employees within firms (EMP ), only a small 
proportion  of the total number of employees.  By  contrast,  in US  firms, 
stock options or other profit sharing plans usually covers over half of the 
total number of employees (Kim and Ouimet, 2014).  Another peculiarity 
of Chinese stock option plans is that on average only 24% are awarded to 
executives (EXE ), whereas 68% are allocated to so-called ‘technicians’ (TEC ). 
These ‘technicians’ include the heads of IT departments and finance 
department with functional ex- pertise required for the success of 
companies.  Drawing the line between essential ‘technicians’ and executives 
seems to be difficult based on public information. 
 
 
6For instance, Core and Guay (2001) report that during the period 1994 to 1997, 
stock options in US firms covered on average 6.9% of the total number of shares 
outstanding. 
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According to Table 6, at least 75% of the stock options have vesting 
periods of at least four years as the 25-percentile is four years (VEST ). On 
average, the vesting period is 4.92 years, and the median is five years. Only a 
small fraction of stock option plans exhibit vesting periods in excess of five 
years. The maximum observed value is ten years, which is more in line with 
US stock options, where vesting periods tend to be ten years or more. 
Regarding the awarding method, on average 60% of stock options are 
awarded through multiple issues (MULT ) compared to 40% of one-off 
awards. These figures might simply reflect the fact that stock options have 
not been introduced before 2006.  Panel B of Table 6 highlights that 
stock options issued by SOEs exhibit higher vesting periods with an 
average of 6.25 years and they tend to be one-offs as only 17% are 
multiple issues. Interestingly, stock options cover less employees and tend 
to go to executives. Finally, Panel C shows a sharp contrast as vesting 
periods are short with an average of 4.73 years, most options refer to 
multiple issues and equity compensations target mostly ‘technicians’, which 
stresses their value for high-technology companies in a competitive market 
for    talent. 
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
 
 
5.2. The determinants of stock option plans 
 
This section explores the determinants of Chinese stock option plans. 
Due to a policy change in 2006, companies were permitted to issue stock 
options, and one year later the first option plans emerged. Arguably, 
between the decision to issue a stock option and the actual issue, there is 
a considerable time gap, which should ensure that explanatory variables 
are weakly exogenous in the sense that they are known, i.e. 
predetermined, at the time the decision is made. Prior literature such as 
Chen et al. (2010) lagged all explanatory variables by one year to ensure 
weak exogeneity.   By default,  this approach reduces    the 
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sample size considerably. In robustness check, we adopt this method, 
leading to consistent results. However, the issue with using lagged 
variables is that many observations are lost, most crucially observations 
in the years 2004 and 2005 prior to the policy change. 
Table 7 shows the results of logistic regressions with the initial issue of 
stock options as dependent variable. Model [A] focuses on firm-specific 
control vari- ables including firm size (SIZE ), financial leverage (LEV ), 
annual growth in total assets (GROWTH ) and return on equity (ROE ). 
Model [B] considers an- nual stock returns prior to the issue (RETURN ) 
and Tobin’s Q (Q ). Model [C] decomposes Tobin’s Q into firm (FIRM ), 
industry (SECTOR) and long- run (LONGRUN ) overvaluation. Model [D] 
explores the impact of operating in the high-technology sector (HITECH ) 
and state-ownership (STATE ). Model [E] considers governance mechanisms 
including DUALITY, the existence of re- muneration committees (COMC ), 
the number of board members (BOARD ), average age of executives (AGE ), 
stock ownership of executives (MANSHARE ) and a measure of ownership 
concentration (HERFINDAHL). All specifications in Table 7 use robust 
standard errors to account for heteroskedasticity. 
Table 7 shows that the majority of the variables are significant, apart 
from firm size (SIZE ), the number of board members (BOARD ) and 
ownership con- centration (HERFINDAHL). The following variables test 
the optimal contract- ing approach based on agency theory. First, 
executives’ direct shareholding (MANSHARE ) has a positive impact on 
granting stock options, indicating that managers with higher equity stakes 
in the companies they run are more likely to be awarded with stock options. 
This finding is contrary to the optimal contract- ing approach but 
consistent with the managerial power approach. Executives with high 
shareholding should have interests aligned with shareholders as they 
participate in any increase in shareholder value. Accordingly, additional 
incen- 
32 
 
This is the accepted version of an article published by Elsevier in Pacific-Basin Finance Journal Vol. 46 Part A., 124-
140. Published version available from: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pacfin.2017.09.007 
Accepted version downloaded from SOAS Research Online: http://eprints.soas.ac.uk/24654/ under CC-BY-NC-ND 4.0 
International Licence 
  
 
 
 
 
 
tives through stock options seems to be obsolete, constituting another form 
of benefiting from future value creation. 
Second, consistent with Conyon and He (2012) and Fang et al. (2015), 
we also find that state control (STATE ) has a negative impact on issuing 
stock op- tions, in line with agency theory. SOEs are controlled through 
various channels, increasing monitoring and limiting information 
asymmetry. Moreover, the state has different interests compared to other 
private shareholders,  not  restricted to maximizing shareholder value. 
Hence, it is conceivable that additional in- centives such as stock options 
are less important. Finally, consistent with our prediction, the result on 
executives’ age shows that young executives are more likely to be awarded 
with options as incentives, which maximizes their impact given the longer 
time span of active work. 
However, we did not observe a significant partial impact of ownership 
concen- tration (HERFINDAHL). This contradicts the results of Conyon and 
He (2012) and Fang et al. (2015), who found negative coefficients albeit of 
small magnitude (β = −0.01, p < 0.05; β = −0.0385, p < 0.01, respectively). 
Their measures of ownership concentration, though, are different from 
ours in that they use the equity ownership of the largest shareholder or 
the two largest shareholders re- spectively, while we construct a wider 
Herfindahl index based on the five largest shareholders. In addition, Conyon 
and He (2012) also consider restricted stock and appreciation rights in their 
analysis, while we focus on stock options. Com- panies operating in the 
high-technology sector (HITECH ) have a tendency to use stock options, 
which is in line with our descriptive findings and consistent with agency 
theory in that these firms need to rely more on R&D resulting in higher 
degrees of information asymmetry. This finding is in line with Core et al. 
(2003). 
In a sense, model [A] in Table 7 highlights that companies in a strong 
posi- 
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tion, both in terms of value drivers and financial health, are more likely to 
issue stock options. These companies excel regarding growth rates (GROWTH 
), prof- itability (ROE ) and low leverage (LEV ). Our finding on leverage is in 
line with Fang et al. (2015), and the positive effect of profitability 
confirms Fang et al. (2015). As shown in [B] a high Tobin’s Q (Q ) tend to 
increase the likelihood that companies issue stock options. So one 
wonders why apparently success- ful companies need stock options to 
ensure that executives focus on enhancing shareholder value. Is it possible 
that powerful CEOs try to get access to stock options to benefit from an 
already successful company? Model [B] provides an- other clue regarding 
the timing of issuing options in that negative annual stock returns (RETURN 
) make issues more likely. Of course, high valuation levels measured by 
Tobin’s Q can be due to high growth expectations, which might warrant 
options to ensure that managers work hard to fulfill these long-term 
expectations. Yet, Tobin’s Q also reflects overvaluation of firms and 
industries. Using the decomposition method discussed in Section 4.4, we are 
able to identify the underlying source of high Tobin’s Qs, which we call firm-
specific (FIRM ), sector-specific (SECTOR) and long-run (LONGRUN ) 
component. Model [C] demonstrates that overvalued firms and industries 
have a more pronounced par- tial impact on the timing of stock options 
than long-term growth expectations. Higher growth opportunities matter, 
confirming Chen et al. (2010), Conyon and He (2012) and Fang et al. 
(2015); however, overvaluation seems to be the pre- dominant factor. One 
possible interpretation is that managers in well performed firms receive 
stock option as a kind of rent-extracting method because better past 
performance could also lead to better future performance even when the 
executives do not work that hard. In summary, there is only partial support 
for the  optimal  contracting approach. 
Considering our proxies for testing the managerial power approach,    
most 
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findings show a positive and significant partial impact. In particular, 
manage- rial direct shareholdings (MANSHARE ), duality (DUALITY ) and 
establishing compensation committees (COMC ) have a positive impact on 
issuing stock op- tions. These significant partial impacts demonstrate that 
when senior managers own more stocks in firms, when CEOs 
simultaneously serve as board chairman and when the firm has 
compensation committee, stock options are more likely to be granted. In 
line with our theoretical discussion, managers are considered to be more 
powerful if they have ownership rights, have influence over the board and 
promote the introduction of compensation committees. Put differently, our 
estimates show that companies are more likely to adopt options when 
executives have more power within organizations. These findings are 
consistent with Chen et al. (2010) and Chen et al. (2011); however, they 
are not aligned with Fang et al. (2015). In summary, our findings largely 
accord with predictions derived from the the managerial power approach. 
 
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
To derive an optimal model specification in the sense of minimizing 
informa- tion criteria such as the Akaike criterion, Table 8 starts with a 
general model [F] combing all specification shown in Table 7. Using a 
general-to-specific ap- proach, we remove insignificant explanatory 
variables from Model [F] and find a reduced specification [G]. Likelihood 
ratio tests confirm that eliminating the variables BOARD, LONGRUN, 
RETURN and HERFINDAHL does not lead to a worse model. The likelihood 
ratio reaches 6.50 with a p-value of 0.165; hence, we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis that the coefficients of the four eliminated variables are equal to 
zero. To check for multicollinearity, we determine variance inflation factors 
(VIF) for all explanatory variables. The maximum VIF is 5.47 in the case 
of firm size, which is still far below the critical level of 10. As we 
decompose Tobin’s Q into its three components, Tobin’s Q is not included  
in 
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any specification to avoid multicollinearity. 
Model [H] uses the reduced set of explanatory variable based on [G], 
however, applying the model to the full sample with robust standard errors. 
Specification [I] removes the dummy for the high-technology sector, 
HITECH, and instead includes industry dummies. In addition to [I], model [J] 
also considers year dummies. Finally, model [K] refers to a random effects 
specification. Essentially, our main empirical findings do not change 
depending on the model specification or method used, highlighting a high 
degree of    robustness. 
 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
 
Since non-SOEs also exhibit differences in their motivation to issue 
stock options due to the presence or absence of controlling shareholders, we 
split non- SOEs into subgroups to investigate the alleged differences. The 
previous general model [F], excluding state control (STATE ), is fitted to all 
four subgroups based on the two thresholds regarding stock ownership. 
Model [F1] and [F3] are based on sub-samples with controlling 
shareholder and [F2] and [F4] are firms with- out. Table 9 shows that 
regardless of the presence of a controlling shareholder, higher managerial 
shareholding (MANSHARE ) and younger executives (AGE ) consistently 
contribute to a higher propensity of awarding stock options. Firm 
performance (ROE ) and DUALITY also show significantly positive partial 
im- pact on awarding options in three out of four models except for [F3]. 
Furthermore, results of [F2] and [F4] highlight that when a controlling 
share- holder is absent, firm-specific variables tend to play a more 
important role in shaping equity compensation. By contrast, firms with a 
controlling shareholder seem less likely to take these factors into account 
as shown in [F1] and [F3]. It seems that most predictions based on the 
managerial power perspective  hold in all subgroups - apart from 
DUALITY in firms controlled by a shareholder holding more than 50%. 
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It seems that most predictions based on the managerial power 
perspective hold in all subgroups. It is apparent that managers can pursue 
private benefits through taking advantage of their power within firms not 
controlled by a princi- pal shareholder. Why would companies with a 
controlling shareholder still need stock options given the power to monitor 
managers? 
A possible explanation supported by Table 4 is that, the controlling 
share- holder either awards stock options to induce the mangers to collude 
in tunneling or pursue the dividend from stock options themselves through 
their control of managerial positions. Several previous studies also 
demonstrate the prevalence of tunneling in Chinese listed firms through 
various channels (Gao and Kling, 2008; Jiang et al., 2010; Liu and Tian, 
2012; Wang and Xiao, 2011). 
 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
 
 
 
5.3. The impact of stock option plans on firm performance 
 
After revealing the underlying determinants of stock option plans, we 
in- vestigate whether stock options had a positive impact on various 
measures of firm performance, including profitability (ROE ), firm growth 
(GROWTH ), and stock returns (RETURN ). Comparing these performance 
measures directly be- tween firms that adopted stock option and those 
that did not is likely to lead to biased results due to an alleged self-
selected problem. That is to say, firms with better prior firm performance 
are more likely than other firms to adopt stock options, as shown in 
Table 7 and 8. Hence, their superior post-event firm performance 
compared to firms that did not issue stock options might be due to past 
performance, unrelated to incentives provided through stock options. 
To account for the alleged self-selected problem, we use a propensity 
score matching approach proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) to 
form a treat- ment group and a control group based on the potential 
determinants of stock 
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options uncovered in able 7 and 8. The treatment group refers to firms 
that adopted stock options during our sample period. The control group 
comprises those firms that share similar characteristics compared to the 
treatment group but did not adopt stock options. To illustrate the idea, we 
know that large firms with low leverage, high growth and high 
profitability among other characteris- tics are more likely to issue stock 
options. So by self-selection, the treatment group consists of firms that 
share these characteristics. The propensity score matching approach 
identifies firms that exhibit similar characteristics, e.g. large firms with low 
debt, high growth and profitability, that did not use stock op- tions. The 
outcome after the event (i.e. issue of options) in terms of the three 
performance measures is then compared between the treatment group and 
the control group. Hence, any differences detected cannot be due to the 
matched characteristics but must be caused by stock options. 
In particular, we use a 5-nearest neighbors matching approach to select 
for each observation in the treatment group five similar observations in 
the con- trol group. This method ensures that all firms, treated or 
untreated, share similar firm characteristics. The first step of propensity 
score matching is to calculate the propensity score of the observations 
which indicate firms’ likeli- hood of adopting stock options in a particular 
year. To avoid missing data for all firm characteristics, there are 396 
observations out of 410 in the treatment group. Secondly, we use 5-nearest 
neighbors matching method to form a match- ing group which have the 
closest propensity scores to those in the treatment group. Hence, 1661 
observations are selected as matched controls. Table 10 reports 
descriptive statistics for the treated, matched and unmatched  sample. 
 
[Insert Table 10 here] 
 
Panel A and B of Table 10 show that all firm characteristics, identified 
as drivers of issuing stock options, are very similar in the treatment and    
control 
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group by construction. Thus indicates a high degree of successful 
matching achieved by the 5-nearest neighbors matching method.  In 
contrast,  Panel  C of Table 10 clearly indicates considerable differences 
between firms with stock options and their matched counterparts as 
compared to the unmatched sample. To investigate the impact of stock 
options, we aim to identify whether the use of them improved firm 
performance measured by profitability (ROE ), firm growth (GROWTH ), 
and stock returns (RETURN ). We use the average treat- ment effect on the 
treated (ATT) to estimates the potential difference between the treatment 
group and the matched control group. Table 11 reports our findings for 
the three measures of firm performance. Standard errors reported are 
bootstrapped. In particular, we explore performance measures one year 
after stock options were issued to ensure weak exogeneity, i.e. stock 
options are issued before performance is measured. Table 11 highlights 
that regardless which performance measure we use, there is no significant 
difference between the treatment group and the matched control group 
(see rows indicated by ATT). In contrast, without the application of the 
propensity score matching approach, i.e. considering the unmatched 
sample (see rows indicated by Un- matched), firms that adopted stock 
options seem to exhibit higher profitability (ROE ) and growth (GROWTH ) 
after the issue. Interestingly, considering stock market performance 
(RETURN ) even the unmatched sample reveals that firms with stock 
options underperformed after the issue. In summary, we do not find 
any evidence that stock options improved firm performance or firm value. 
 
[Insert Table 11 here] 
 
 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
It has been a decade since China first permitted equity 
compensations in 2006.  This study presents the most recent picture of 
Chinese stock options 
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and it is the first attempt to analyze executive compensation from both 
per- spectives, optimal contracting and managerial power. Our results 
indicate that stock options cannot be merely explained by the traditional 
optimal contracting approach. Managerial power plays an important - 
even a predominant - role in firms’ decisions to grant stock options. Under 
the managerial power approach, managers have both the incentive and 
ability to expropriate shareholders by adopting more favorable executive 
compensation. Stock options can be a favor- able compensation as they do 
not totally reflect managers’ own performance. Therefore, if managerial 
power is relevant in the Chinese context, we would ob- serve a positive 
correlation between managerial power and the adoption of stock options.  
Our results support this prediction. 
Since managerial power is latent, we use managerial stock 
shareholding, the existence of compensation committee, duality and board 
size as proxies. We con- sider managers powerful if they hold more shares, 
if there exists a compensation committee, if CEOs also serve as board 
chairman and if there are more mem- bers on boards. First, we find that 
when managers own more equity, they are more likely to be awarded with 
stock options. As higher managerial sharehold- ing is usually accompanied 
with more power within the organizations, we thus conclude that higher 
managerial stock ownership gives managers more power to adopt favorable 
pay, such as stock options. This contradicts the traditional op- timal 
contracting approach which argues that stock options would be less likely 
to be adopted in firms with higher managerial shareholding, because 
managerial shareholding would largely reduce agency problem by 
providing managers the most direct incentives. 
Our result on compensation committees and duality also support the 
man- agerial power approach. We find that if firms have compensation 
committees, managers are more likely to be awarded with options.  It is 
possible that be- 
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cause the compensation committee members are hired by human resources 
and are indirectly subordinate to managers, their gratitude towards 
managers leads them to set favorable compensation packages in the 
interest of managers, even though the committee is originally designed to 
offer cost effective pay arrange- ment. Favorable pay can also be achieved 
through managers exerting potential influence over compensation 
committees. We also find that when CEOs also serve as board chairman, 
managers are more likely to be granted options. This result suggests that 
managerial power due to duality provides self-dealing op- portunities to 
extract  rents. 
Except  for  managerial  power,  ownership  type,  firms’  and  executives’  
char- acteristics are also essential factors in granting stock options in 
Chinese firms. Our results demonstrate that state controlled firms are less 
likely to adopt stock options than private firms.  In non-SOEs, however, 
motives for adopting stock options  differ.  In  particular,  if  controlling  
shareholders  are  present,  stock  op- tions are less common - but if they are 
used they seem to be awarded to induce managers to collude with 
controlling shareholders, leading to tunneling.  Alter- natively, the 
controlling shareholder could also pursue the ’windfall’ from stock options 
through their own control over managerial positions. 
However, ownership concentration does not matter. Firms with 
younger ex- ecutives are more willing to grant stock options as 
compensation. In addition, larger firms and firms with lower financial 
leverage and more growth opportu- nities are more likely to adopt stock 
options. As to prior firm performance, we observe a significant 
relationship between prior ROE and options. Finally, in line with Core et 
al. (2003), our results indicate that high technology firms are more likely 
to award stock options. 
We then investigate whether stock options have improved firm 
performance. In contrast to prior literature (Chen et al., 2010), we use a 
propensity score 
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matching method to remove an alleged self-selection bias. We use both 
ac- counting based ROE and stock based annual stock return to measure 
firm per- formance. In addition, we consider firm growth. Our results 
show that the Chinese stock options did not improve profitability, growth 
and annual stock returns. This contradicts Fang et al. (2015), who reports 
a positive impact of stock options on firm performance. The latter is most 
likely due to self-selection, not controlled for by Fang et al. (2015). 
In summary, Chinese stock options have not achieved expected results 
in terms of improving firm performance. Although they are originally 
designed to benefit shareholders, managerial power and rent exaction also 
play significant roles. Stock options seem to be a game between powerful 
managers and cor- porate governance mechanisms. To what extent will 
managerial influence move the pay arrangement away from the optimal 
contracting outcome depends on how the Chinese firms balance the 
increasing managerial power with responding managerial accountability. 
This is especially the case in China where managers have been achieving 
considerable control over the firms due to continuous re- forms. Less 
developed financial disclosure also contributes to the rent exaction of 
managers. In addition, tunneling is still evident in Chinese firms, though 
in a more subtle form. By awarding equity compensations to managers, 
control- ling shareholders pave their way to take advantage of minority 
shareholders. In summary, current legal protections and regulations in 
Chinese stock markets are not fully developed to mitigate the 
entrenchment from both managers and controlling shareholders 
effectively. Although a serious of regulations and prac- tices had been 
brought forward to complete the Chinese capital market, their real impacts 
are still in doubt. 
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Table 1: Variables and definitions 
 
 
Variables Definition 
 
 
ISSUE Dummy if company issues stock options in year t 
OPTION Dummy if company has issued stock options 
HITECH Dummy if company belongs to the high-tech 
industry LEV Long and short-term debt to total  assets 
SIZE Natural log of total asset 
GROWTH Annual growth rate of total 
assets ROE Return on equity 
RETURN Annual stock return 
COMC Dummy if the firm set compensation 
committee DUALITY Dummy if the CEO serves also as 
the chairman 
of the board 
BOARD The number of directors on the    board 
AGE Average age of executives  
MANSHARE Shareholding of executives in % of  
total 
STATE Dummy if the state is the dominant  
shareholder HERFINDAHL Index based on the five largest 
shareholders 
CONTROL30 Dummy if controlling shareholder holds more than 30% of 
share CONTROL50 Dummy if controlling shareholder holds more than 
50% of shares Q Tobin’s Q defined as market value of equity and debt 
relative to total assets 
FIRM Firm-specific overvaluation based on a decomposition 
SECTOR Industry-specific overvaluation based on a 
decomposition LONGRUN Long-term growth expectations based on a 
decomposition 
ORECTA Proxy for tunneling measured by other receivables to total assets 
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Table 2:  The adoption of stock options 
 
The table reports the number of newly awarded stock option plans per year in column 
ISSUE and in % of all companies in the sample in the column labeled in % of total. 
The column OPTION shows the number of firms with an active stock option plan, and 
the fifth column expresses this number in % of all companies. The last two columns 
report the proportion in 
% of state-owned companies (STATE ) that have an option plan and the proportion in % 
of companies in the high technology sector (HITECH ) that have adopted stock options. 
 
Year ISSUE in  %  
of 
t t l 
OPTION in  %  
of 
t t l 
in % 
of STATE 
in % 
of HITECH 
2004 0 0.00 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2005 0 0.00 0 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2006 32 2.20 32 2.20 0.81 3.30 
2007 13 0.83 45 2.86 1.35 4.12 
2008 56 3.45 100 6.15 3.09 11.65 
2009 18 1.02 112 6.32 3.11 11.11 
2010 59 2.77 159 7.47 3.95 15.34 
2011 86 3.64 237 10.03 4.56 21.86 
2012 69 2.77 292 11.72 6.25 25.00 
2013 87 3.43 364 14.35 6.73 28.72 
2014 62 2.34 410 15.46 7.87 30.50 
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Table 3:  The adoption of stock options in non-SOEs with and without controlling shareholder 
 
 
 
 
The table reports mean adoption rates of stock option plans in non-SOEs with and 
with- out controlling shareholder, applying the thresholds 30% and 50% respectively. 
The columns Control refer to non-SOEs with controlling shareholder, whereas the columns 
No control refer to those without controlling  shareholder. 
 
 
 
Year 
 
 
Contro
l 
30% 
No control 
 
 
Contro
l 
50% 
No control 
2004 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2005 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2006 4.44 4.05 1.54 4.54 
2007 5.13 4.61 4.60 4.88 
2008 8.24 11.17 8.70 9.89 
2009 5.67 10.41 6.14 8.12 
2010 7.04 10.56 7.32 8.73 
2011 9.54 13.50 8.64 11.75 
2012 11.32 14.72 9.90 13.41 
2013 14.64 16.71 11.96 16.46 
2014 15.81 17.47 12.01 17.61 
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Table 4:  Tunneling in non-SOEs subgroups before and after issuing stock options 
 
 
The table reports a proxy for tunneling around stock option issues in non-SOEs with 
and without controlling shareholder. We use inter-corporate loans, measured by other 
receivables to total assets, to proxy the level of tunneling. [t-1] denotes one year before 
the firm issued stock options, [t+1] and [t+2] denote one year and two years after the 
issue, respectively. The first two columns show the difference in expected tunneling 
comparing [t-1] and [t+1], and p-values refer to t-tests. The third and fourth column 
compares expected tunneling be- fore and two years after the adoption of stock options. 
We fit a panel OLS model to control for firm size, leverage, growth, profitability and 
industry. Hence, reported differences in tun- neling account for these firm and industry-
specific effects. 
 
 
from [t-1] to [t+1] from [t-1] to [t+2] 
 
 difference p-value difference p-value 
Control(30%) 0.064 (0.196) 0.129 (0.116) 
No Control(30%) -0.016 (0.832) 0.058 (0.535) 
Control(50%) 0.235∗∗ (0.005) 0.293∗ (0.023) 
No Control(50%) -0.009 (0.846) 0.056 (0.417) 
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 
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Table 5:  Descriptive statistics:  Firm level 
 
This table reports descriptive statistics of all firm-level variables including the number 
of ob- servations (N), mean, standard deviation (sd), minimum (min) and maximum 
value (max), and different quantiles (p25, p50 and p75). 
 
 N mean sd min p25 p50 p75 max 
ISSUE 21349 0.02 0.15 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
OPTION 21349 0.08 0.27 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
HITECH 21349 0.07 0.26 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
LEV 21349 0.48 0.22 0.11 0.30 0.48 0.64 0.86 
SIZE 21346 21.64 1.17 19.83 20.76 21.49 22.35 24.18 
GROWTH 18628 0.15 0.22 -0.17 0.01 0.10 0.23 0.74 
ROE 21345 0.07 0.09 -0.15 0.03 0.07 0.12 0.25 
RETURN 20683 0.28 0.70 -0.58 -0.21 0.04 0.57 2.07 
COMC 21349 0.32 0.47 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
DUALITY 17054 0.20 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
BOARD 21349 7.98 3.62 0.00 7.00 9.00 9.00 22.00 
AGE 21344 47.82 3.47 0.00 45.62 47.91 50.08 61.36 
MANSHARE 21345 0.07 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.99 
STATE 21341 0.31 0.46 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
HERFINDAHL 21342 0.18 0.13 0.00 0.08 0.15 0.25 0.80 
CONTROL30 21349 0.62 0.48 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
CONTROL50 21349 0.25 0.43 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
ORECTA 21188 0.03 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.38 
Q 21349 1.69 1.34 0.13 0.69 1.31 2.30 5.12 
FIRM 21340 -0.00 0.75 -3.25 -0.30 0.06 0.45 2.34 
SECTOR 21340 0.00 0.35 -1.78 -0.28 0.04 0.27 1.87 
LONGRUN 21346 0.18 0.39 -1.17 -0.02 0.25 0.45 1.45 
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Table 6:  Descriptive statistics:  Stock options 
 
The table reports descriptive statistics of characteristics of stock options including the 
num- ber of observations (N), mean, standard deviation (sd), minimum value (min), 
25-percentile (p25), median (p50), 75-percentile (p75) and the maximum value (max). 
Panel A focuses on all newly issued stock option plans. Panel B reports the 
characteristics of stock options in the case of state-owned enterprises, whereas Panel C 
refers to companies operating in the high- technology sector. 
 
 N mean sd min p25 p50 p75 max 
Panel A: All options        
SHARE 482 3.31 2.33 0.00 1.50 2.81 4.36 10.78 
EMP 392 0.09 0.09 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.12 0.58 
EXE 482 0.24 0.22 0.00 0.09 0.19 0.35 1.00 
TEC 482 0.68 0.23 0.00 0.59 0.73 0.85 1.00 
VEST 482 4.92 1.40 0.00 4.00 5.00 5.00 10.00 
MULT 482 0.60 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Panel B: SOEs        
SHARE 52 1.83 1.89 0.00 0.82 1.00 2.36 9.03 
EMP 39 0.05 0.07 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.08 0.36 
EXE 52 0.36 0.28 0.00 0.16 0.28 0.46 1.00 
TEC 52 0.59 0.29 0.00 0.43 0.68 0.81 0.96 
VEST 52 6.25 2.02 4.00 5.00 5.00 7.00 10.00 
MULT 52 0.17 0.38 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Panel C: High-tech        
SHARE 81 3.36 1.96 0.31 2.13 3.00 4.05 10.00 
EMP 62 0.12 0.09 0.00 0.05 0.11 0.20 0.38 
EXE 81 0.17 0.18 0.00 0.05 0.12 0.25 1.00 
TEC 81 0.77 0.18 0.00 0.70 0.82 0.89 1.00 
VEST 81 4.73 1.02 0.00 4.00 5.00 5.00 8.00 
MULT 81 0.63 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
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Table 7:  Timing of new  issues 
 
Logistic regressions explain the issue of stock options. [A] focuses on firm-specific 
control variables including firm size (SIZE ), financial leverage (LEV ), growth (GROWTH 
) and re- turn on equity (ROE ). [B] considers stock returns prior to the issue (RETURN 
) and To- bin’s Q (Q ). [C] decomposes Tobin’s Q into firm (FIRM ), industry (SECTOR) and 
long-run (LONGRUN ) overvaluation. [D] explores the high-technology sector (HITECH ) 
and state- ownership (STATE ). [E] considers governance mechanisms including 
DUALITY, remuner- ation committees (COMC ), board size (BOARD ), average age of 
executives (AGE ), stock ownership of executives (MANSHARE ) and ownership 
concentration (HERFINDAHL). 
 
 [A] [B] [C] [D] [E] 
SIZE 0.029     
LEV -2.543∗∗∗     
GROWTH 1.169∗∗∗     
ROE 4.197∗∗∗     
RETURN  -0.261∗∗∗    
Q  0.298∗∗∗    
FIRM   0.785∗∗∗   
SECTOR   0.350∗∗   
LONGRUN   0.258∗   
HITECH    0.934∗∗∗  
STATE    -1.307∗∗∗  
DUALITY     0.378∗∗∗ 
COMC     0.414∗∗∗ 
BOARD     -0.020 
AGE     -0.066∗∗∗ 
MANSHARE     2.265∗∗∗ 
HERFINDAHL     -0.488 
ll -2068.130 -2246.140 -2241.660 -2222.761 -1824.855 
aic 4146.259 4498.279 4491.320 4451.521 3663.709 
bic 4185.421 4522.090 4523.194 4475.427 3717.917 
r2 p 0.049 0.018 0.027 0.035 0.058 
N 18626 20683 21340 21341 17051 
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 
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Table  8:  Model specifications 
 
The table reports logistic regressions with the timing of issues of stock options as the 
de- pendent variable (ISSUE ). Compared to Table 7, additional model specifications are 
tested. Estimation of [F] to [G] is based on the same sample size to ensure that likelihood 
ratio tests are valid. Model [F] starts with a general model including all explanatory 
variables, and [G] reduces the number of variables. Specification [H] refers to the 
reduced set of variables but applies a robust estimation to the whole sample. In 
addition, model [I] considers industry dummies, removing the dummy HITECH. Model 
[J] in addition to [I] includes year dummies. Finally, model [K] refers to a random effects 
specification. 
 
 [F] [G] [H] [I] [J] [K] 
SIZE 0.311∗∗ 0.239∗∗∗ 0.243∗∗∗ 0.286∗∗∗ 0.329∗∗∗ 0.334∗∗∗ 
LEV -1.399∗∗∗ -1.547∗∗∗ -1.536∗∗∗ -1.722∗∗∗ -1.531∗∗∗ -1.584∗∗∗ 
GROWTH 0.760∗∗ 0.744∗∗ 0.736∗∗∗ 0.737∗∗∗ 0.669∗∗ 0.645∗ 
ROE 3.575∗∗∗ 3.504∗∗∗ 3.276∗∗∗ 3.096∗∗∗ 2.833∗∗∗ 2.890∗∗∗ 
RETURN -0.160      
FIRM 0.295∗∗ 0.225∗ 0.275∗∗ 0.271∗∗ 0.326∗∗∗ 0.330∗∗ 
SECTOR -0.304 -0.443∗ -0.429∗ -0.439∗ 0.767∗ 0.757 
LONGRUN 0.205      
HITECH 0.537∗∗ 0.579∗∗∗ 0.574∗∗∗    
STATE -0.909∗∗∗ -0.985∗∗∗ -0.986∗∗∗ -0.884∗∗∗ -0.955∗∗∗ -0.936∗∗∗ 
DUALITY 0.324∗∗ 0.333∗∗ 0.329∗∗ 0.308∗∗ 0.305∗ 0.309∗ 
COMC 0.275∗∗ 0.282∗∗ 0.282∗∗ 0.283∗∗ 0.230∗ 0.231∗ 
BOARD -0.028      
AGE -0.083∗∗∗ -0.082∗∗∗ -0.081∗∗∗ -0.079∗∗∗ -0.082∗∗∗ -0.085∗∗∗ 
MANSHARE 1.773∗∗∗ 1.795∗∗∗ 1.810∗∗∗ 1.658∗∗∗ 1.575∗∗∗ 1.616∗∗∗ 
HERFINDAHL -0.736      
ll -1604.225 -1607.476 -1610.647 -1584.854 -1543.972 -1542.542 
aic 3242.449 3240.952 3247.294 3223.709 3155.945 3155.083 
bic 3371.886 3339.933 3346.540 3429.350 3412.612 3419.299 
r2 p 0.120 0.118 0.120 0.131 0.140  
N 14972 14972 15280 15008 14031 14031 
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 
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Table 9:  Model specifications for non-SOEs with and without controlling shareholder 
 
 
 
The table reports logistic regressions of the general model for the non-SOE subgroups 
based on the two thresholds of 30% and 50%. [F1] and [F2] refer to non-SOEs with 
and without controlling shareholders based on the 30% threshold.  [F3] and [F4] apply 
the 50% threshold. 
 
 30% 
[F1] 
 
 
[F2] 
50% 
[F3] 
 
 
[F4] 
SIZE 0.020 0.717∗∗∗ 0.022 0.434∗∗∗ 
LEV -1.376∗∗ -1.274∗ -0.695 -1.590∗∗∗ 
GROWTH 0.612 0.872∗ 0.503 0.779∗∗ 
ROE 3.672∗∗ 2.930∗ 1.934 3.596∗∗∗ 
RETURN -0.075 -0.218 -0.430 -0.089 
FIRM 0.241 0.459∗ 0.571 0.286∗ 
SECTOR -0.411 -0.335 0.588 -0.550∗ 
LONGRUN -0.315 0.959 -0.741 0.526 
HITECH 0.550∗ 0.499 0.437 0.512∗∗ 
DUALITY 0.318∗ 0.385∗ 0.427 0.295∗ 
COMC 0.342∗ 0.009 0.408 0.162 
BOARD -0.058 0.019 -0.074 -0.009 
AGE -0.085∗∗∗ -0.094∗∗∗ -0.119∗∗ -0.084∗∗∗ 
MANSHARE 1.472∗∗∗ 2.189∗∗∗ 1.634∗∗ 1.937∗∗∗ 
HERFINDAHL -0.337 1.895 1.216 -0.257 
ll -819.312 -543.487 -250.093 -1114.344 
aic 1670.623 1118.974 532.186 2260.689 
bic 1777.096 1221.521 621.097 2373.092 
r2 p 0.097 0.128 0.119 0.107 
N 5736 4488 1914 8310 
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 
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Table 10: Treated, matched and unmatched sample 
 
The table reports descriptive statistics of variables that explain the adoption of stock 
options for the treatment group (Panel A), the matched control group (Panel B), and 
the unmatched sample (Panel C). Descriptive statistics include the number of 
observations (N), mean, stan- dard deviation (sd), minimum value (min), 25-percentile 
(p25), median (p50), 75-percentile (p75) and the maximum value  (max). 
 
 N mean sd min p25 p50 p75 max 
Panel A Treated        
ISSUE 396 0.99 0.07 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
SIZE 396 21.58 1.05 19.83 20.78 21.37 22.23 24.18 
LEV 396 0.38 0.20 0.11 0.20 0.34 0.53 0.86 
GROWTH 396 0.22 0.22 -0.17 0.07 0.15 0.34 0.74 
ROE 396 0.10 0.06 -0.15 0.07 0.10 0.14 0.25 
FIRM 396 0.31 0.53 -2.57 -0.03 0.32 0.69 1.86 
SECTOR 396 0.02 0.27 -0.54 -0.14 0.02 0.14 1.15 
HITECH 396 0.17 0.37 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
STATE 396 0.11 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
DUALITY 396 0.35 0.48 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
COMC 396 0.42 0.49 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
AGE 396 46.33 3.29 37.15 43.93 46.22 48.74 55.63 
MANSHARE 396 0.22 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.07 0.44 0.85 
Panel B Matched        
ISSUE 1661 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
SIZE 1661 21.62 1.10 19.83 20.80 21.46 22.32 24.18 
LEV 1661 0.39 0.21 0.11 0.21 0.37 0.56 0.86 
GROWTH 1661 0.21 0.24 -0.17 0.05 0.14 0.30 0.74 
ROE 1661 0.10 0.07 -0.15 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.25 
FIRM 1661 0.28 0.57 -2.93 -0.09 0.26 0.66 2.33 
SECTOR 1661 0.01 0.31 -1.70 -0.14 0.03 0.17 1.17 
HITECH 1661 0.14 0.35 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
STATE 1661 0.11 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
DUALITY 1661 0.30 0.46 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
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COMC 1661 0.44 0.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
AGE 1661 46.68 3.97 0.00 44.50 46.85 48.89 58.31 
MANSHARE 1661 0.19 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.39 0.89 
Panel C Unmatched        
ISSUE 20867 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
SIZE 20864 21.64 1.17 19.83 20.76 21.49 22.35 24.18 
LEV 20867 0.48 0.22 0.11 0.31 0.49 0.64 0.86 
GROWTH 18163 0.14 0.22 -0.17 0.00 0.10 0.23 0.74 
ROE 20863 0.07 0.09 -0.15 0.03 0.07 0.12 0.25 
FIRM 20858 -0.01 0.75 -3.25 -0.31 0.05 0.45 2.34 
SECTOR 20858 -0.00 0.35 -1.78 -0.29 0.04 0.27 1.87 
HITECH 20867 0.07 0.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
STATE 20859 0.32 0.47 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
DUALITY 16643 0.20 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
COMC 20867 0.32 0.47 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
AGE 20862 47.85 3.47 0.00 45.67 47.94 50.11 61.36 
MANSHARE 20863 0.07 0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.99 
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Table 11:  The impact of stock options on performance 
 
The table reports average treatment effects firm for three measures of firm per- 
formance, including  profitability  (ROE ),  firm  growth  (GROWTH ),  and  stock  re- 
turns (RETURN ). The average treatment   effect   on   the   treated   (ATT)   compares 
the treatment   group   and   the   matched   control   group   after   the   event,   i.e.   one 
year   after   stock   options   were   issued.        Standard   errors   (Std)   are    
bootstrapped. 
 
Variable Sample Treated Controls Difference Std t-value 
ROE Unmatched 0.099 0.071 0.028 0.003 10.97 
 ATT 0.099 0.099 0.000 0.002 -0.04 
GROWTH Unmatched 0.210 0.140 0.070 0.006 11.15 
 ATT 0.210 0.208 0.002 0.007 0.23 
RETURN Unmatched 0.256 0.316 -0.060 0.022 -2.72 
 ATT 0.255 0.270 -0.015 0.023 -0.64 
 
